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Abstract: 
Marketing Board system was one of the mechanisms of British colonial policy in 
Nigeria. Primary products were channeled through the Boards to Europe at the expense 
of both the Nigerian state and the farmers, the producers of these commodities. This 
study examines produce buying via Marketing Boards in Nigeria and specifically 
interrogates the fiscal role of Western Nigeria Marketing Board. It argues that the 
Marketing Boards, in spite of their exploitative nature was beneficial to the regional 
governments. In the Western Region, the Western Nigeria Marketing Board (WNMB) 
became the fiscal arm of the regional governments. It became the major financier of 
development projects in the region through the region’s development corporations. The 
paper concludes that the process of development was circumscribed due to 
misappropriation and diversion of funds derived from the Western Region Marketing 
Board.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The British colonial economic policy was anchored on the belief that a colonial territory 
existed primarily for the benefit of the metropolitan country. The economic relationship 
between Britain, the metropolitan country and her colonies was expected to be 
governed by the principle of comparative advantage, implying that a country should 
specialise in the production of what she was best suited for. Consequently, a colony was 
expected to supply the raw materials needed by the industries in the metropolis. 
Nigeria as a colonized country was expected to provide not only the basic raw materials 
for the industries in Britain but also serve as market for the sale of European 
manufactured goods (Olubomehin, 2012, 37). This means colonies must be self-
supporting; that they must provide agricultural export crops for the imperial country 
and that they must buy its manufactured goods in return (Webster and Idowu, 1967, 
278). Thus, colonial economic policies in Nigeria promoted export crop and mineral 
production to feed the British factories. The colonial territory of Nigeria served not only 
as ready source of cheap raw materials to feed the growing industries in Britain and 
European in general, but also as trading post for the British and European traders and 
merchants. 
 By the same token, the policy encouraged large scale cultivation of agricultural 
produce especially in the three main regions; the West produced cocoa, and rubber; the 
Eastern produced palm produce and rubber while the North produced groundnuts and 
cotton among other agricultural produce and raw materials (Falola, 2004, 48). Nigeria 
was among the highest producers of major primary products, which were in high 
demand during the colonial era. Nigeria was the third producer of cocoa. 
  Against this background, the British realised that to achieve their economic 
objective, a strategy for acquiring these needed agricultural produce from the various 
regions of Nigeria became expedient having encouraged the production of these crops 
in the various regions. However, given the fact that one major reason why Britain 
colonized Nigeria was to ensure a cheap and steady supply of raw materials to British 
industries, the colonial administration completely discouraged the cultivation of food 
crops while encouraging cash crops production the raw materials, which Britain needed 
included cotton for British textile factories, rubber for tyres and other products, palm oil 
and kernel for soap and margarine, groundnut for manufacturing oil, hides and skins 
for leather products, timber for furniture as well as tin, coal, amongst others (Onimode, 
1981, 80-81).   
 The strategies adopted by colonialists for buying and acquiring these 
commodities were exploitative in nature. Buying and exporting African agricultural 
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produce from Nigeria and Africa in general dates back to the introduction of the 
legitimate trade, after the demise of the obnoxious slave trade and the advent of the 
Industrial Revolution. European traders had explored Africa in search of raw materials 
to feed their nascent industries and get market for their finished goods in the late 19th 
century. Trading companies were established by these European merchants primarily 
for the export of primary products. Exports of farm crops including minerals were in 
the hands of a very few Europeans and American concerns. The United African 
Company UAC for example handled nearly half of West Africa’s overseas trade, and 
the Compagnie francaise de l’Afrique occidentale CFAO along with Societe commercial 
de l’aouest africain SCOA accounted for most of the rest. The Unilever dominated palm 
oil exports from Belgian Congo as well as from West Africa. Control of market behavior 
and taxation of long distance trade were also well established perquisites of traditional 
authorities long before European occupation (Jones, 1987, 376).   
 After the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, which culminated in the scramble for and 
partitioning of Africa, and after the revocation of the charter of the Royal Niger 
Company in 1899, which had given the company a quasi-governmental function and 
made George Tubman Goldie and his European agents de facto colonial masters, the 
stage became set for the proper colonization of Nigeria. Indeed, the stage was set for 
effective and formal exploitation of Nigeria. Between 1900 and 1914, Britain succeeded 
in making herself the new paramount ruler of the entire Nigerian nation (Ayandele, 
2006, 383). 
  
2. Establishment of Marketing Boards 
 
Marketing Boards were export monopoly set up in British West Africa in the 1940s to 
control export crops such as cocoa, groundnuts, and cotton, rubber and oil palm 
produce. The raison d’être for this was primarily to stabilize the prices and income of 
these commodities (Van der Laan and van Haaren, 1990, 5).  
 The origins of Marketing Boards in Nigeria and indeed West Africa are to be 
found in the attempts by British merchants firms to organize monopolistic cartels to 
purchase produce. As from 1939, the British government under the auspices of the 
United African Company was determined to buy the entire coca output of British West 
Africa. Thus, it established West African Cocoa Control Board in 1940 and the West 
African Produce Control Board of 1942. The West African Produce Control Board 
covered cocoa, groundnuts, and palm produce and had its jurisdiction in all British 
West African territories. This enabled the British government’s Ministry of Food and 
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Supply strong control and access over the Nigerian agricultural produce (Offu, 2012, 
62).  
  For greater convenience in the expropriation of the Nigerian agricultural 
produce, the West African Produce Control Board was decentralized and commodity 
Boards were established to cater separately for these products. Thus, the Nigeria Cocoa 
Marketing Board was established in 1947 while the Nigeria Groundnut Marketing 
Board, the Nigeria Oil Palm Marketing Board and the Nigeria Cotton Marketing Board 
were established in 1949 and took over the buying and exporting of these crops from 
the West African Produce Control Board (Bauer, 1954, 54) and (Hawkings, 1958, 51)  
 The British gave two justifications in their defence for the Marketing Boards: the 
first argued that the producers would benefit from a regulated system of marketing  in 
which government fixed crop prices for each season and licensed buyers to protect 
farmers from ‘abuses’. The second claim was that the boards would use their funds to 
serve as a cushion against short and intermediate price fluctuations in the world market 
price; some funds would also be used for other purposes of general benefit to the 
producers and industries such as research, disease control and eradication and 
rehabilitation of diseased cocoa trees, the amelioration of indebtedness, the 
encouragement of cooperation and the provision of other amenities and facilities to 
producers (Afeikhana and Ogunkola, 2000).  
 Put differently, there was a deliberate effort to depress prices paid to Nigerian 
farmers to hold down wartime inflation in Britain. This amounted to a tax on Nigerian 
farmers to finance the British war effort. Many of these Marketing Boards subsequently 
established stabilisation funds to protect farmers against the widely anticipated collapse 
of the post-war boom. Almost inevitably, the Marketing Boards lent these funds to 
central government, thus adding an additional method of extraction of surplus to the 
export duties that were widely collected. The Boards used price fixing to accumulate 
huge reserves. Prices were arrived at by conditions in the world market, domestic 
transport cost and the margins of profits to be made by the produce buyers, the 
middlemen between the farmers and the Boards. In years without contracts for bulk 
buying with a government agency in Britain, the Boards relied on the Nigerian produce 
marketing Company based in the United Kingdom to sell on the open market and to 
organize shipping (Helleiner, 1977).  
  Marketing Board system during the colonial period implied withholding 
substantial proportion of what ought to be the farmer’s incomes either as a means of 
combating inflation or preparing for the foreign exchange balances. This was forced 
saving that ended up hurting the farmer and agriculture as a business. It would have 
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been quite instructive to see what farmers could have done with their earnings if these 
were not withheld for other development purposes by the state (Akande, 2003, 17-18).  
 Be that as it may the colonial government placed high premium on stabilization. 
It would be recalled that the colonial government had prescribed formula to which 
rigid adherence was given; 70 percent of these accumulating reserves were to be 
retained for stabilization purposes, inordinately high stabilization reserves were soon 
accumulated. At the end of 1954, Nigerian Marketing Boards held upwards of £66 
million of investments in Britain which were specifically allocated to the provision of 
‘economic security’ to the farmers. As Marketing Boards reserves mounted, some 
modification to the system of distribution of trading surpluses was introduced. 
Gradually the stabilization role of the Marketing Boards was eroded. For instance, in 
order to enable Production Development Boards to plan their programmes more 
effectively, the oil palm produce Marketing Board guaranteed them a minimum 
allocation of £800 for each of the years 1950-55. In order to fulfill this obligation, during 
its two years of trading loses, it was necessary actually to reduce reserves which were 
not originally to be employed for development purposes at all. This may be said to 
mark a major breach in the idea that Marketing Board’s assets were purely stabilization 
reserves. In the same vein, the Groundnut Marketing Board made a guarantee of 500 
pounds per annum for each of the seasons 1950/51 to 1954/55. More significantly, the 
Marketing Boards undertook to lend to the central government a sum which they can 
be reasonably certain they will not require within the next fifteen years- ultimately 
placed at 14 million pounds. Reserves of the size which had been accumulated by 1954 
constituted a very great temptation to the regional governments which had been 
granted vastly increased responsibility for the promotion of economic development 
following the constitutional revision of 1954 (Helleiner, 1977).  
 As a result of a new constitutional arrangement in 1954, which regionalized 
Nigeria, four Commodity Boards were established; the Western Region Marketing 
Board, catered majorly for cocoa among other products, Eastern Regional Marketing 
Board was primarily for palm produce while two Commodity Boards for groundnuts 
and cotton was handled by the Northern Region Marketing Board, and these Boards 
were to be in charge of the export crops within their various territories. After their 
creation, they inherited a huge sum of £8, 320,096, part of what had been accumulated 
since the war years. After the war, the prices of commodities were constantly high but 
the Boards kept paying lower than the international prices. There were some years 
when the marketing boards accumulated well over 100 percent. For instance in 1953 the 
Boards realized on the sales of cocoa £28 million to the farmers. These surpluses were 
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mainly kept in British banks, where they were used to finance British economic 
recovery. 
 There was a Central Marketing, which served as a coordinating Board and was 
responsible for overseas marketing and export of the commodities controlled by the 
Regional Boards. However, the Nigerian Produce Marketing Company sold such 
commodities abroad on behalf of the Central Marketing Board. In 1958, the government 
again modified these arrangements in the light of further constitutional changes. It 
abolished the Central Marketing Board and re-allocated its functions to the Federal 
Ministry of Commerce and Industries, the Regional Marketing Boards and the 
reconstituted Nigerian Produce Marketing Company Limited (Tamuno, 2006, 402).  
 The Boards invariably provided funds for the economic development of the areas 
of production and for scientific research apart from its stabilization function. The 
accumulated funds were allocated thus: 70 percent for price stabilization, 7½ percent for 
research and 22½ for development. As to the price policy, the Boards had absolute 
control of purchases of the major export products. They fixed the buying prices at the 
beginning of each crop season but the manipulation of prices came into play when the 
Boards faced major fluctuations in the world prices. Tied up with this policy was the 
policy of adopting different grades for the same product and paying different prices for 
each grade. Revenues accumulated by these government monopolies from the surplus 
of selling prices over producer prices less marketing costs from 1947 to 1954 totaled 
N239.3 million and included N92.1 million for cocoa, N70 million for palm produce, 
N61.1 million for groundnuts and 16.6 million for cotton. Huge sums were transferred 
from these Boards to the new Regional Marketing Boards. The Eastern Region got N22.9 
million, the Northern Region N65.3 million while the West had N85.8 million. During 
the 1954-61 period, the Regional Marketing Boards accumulated huge surpluses: 
Eastern Region N47.8 million; north, N63.8million and Western Region N125.1 million 
(Idachaba, 1980, 41). From the accumulated funds, the Boards provided the capital 
which financed the establishment of the regional production development boards, later 
known as Development Corporation. The Marketing Board also made direct grants and 
loans to the government for financing development projects e.g. the former Western 
Nigerian Marketing Board made outright grant of N20 million and loan of the same 
amount to the regional government to execute its development plan of 1955-1960 
(Akande, 2003).  
 The Marketing Boards were originally presented as ‚humanitarian‛ scheme to 
save farmers from financial strangulations, but ultimately becoming an avenue for the 
government to exploit the poor and to build foreign reserves. The Boards effectively put 
in the hands of the government power to market crops, a power that was shared with a 
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selected number of privileged firms. Marketing Boards aimed at maintaining stable 
prices for export commodities in order to protect the farmers from unpredictable 
fluctuations in prices. The Boards built a reserve by underpaying farmers when prices 
were high but subsidizing them when prices were low. The funds generated by the 
Marketing Boards sustained many of the activities of the regional governments in the 
1950s, funded several development programs and provided opportunities for the first 
generation of Nigerian politicians to have access to money, which they used for 
development purposes as well as to fund political parties and reward political and 
business associates (Beckam, 2004, 97).   
  Generally, the Boards even after regionalization enjoyed monopoly powers. They 
fixed prices and were the only ones who could buy and sell abroad. Where the products 
were consumed locally, as in the case of groundnuts, the Boards had to pay competitive 
prices, lest the farmers paid to local consumers. In the case of cocoa, there was no local 
use for the product and a farmer had to wait for five or seven years before harvesting 
from a new tree. The fact that farmers had no domestic use of the product other than to 
sell them meant that the Boards could manipulate the prices to accumulate more 
reserves. Regional Boards relentlessly pursued the old policy of underpaying farmers in 
order to accumulate reserves. If the producers were deceived in the 1940s as to the 
intention of the Marketing Boards, this was no longer the case in the 1950s; resounding 
complaints of being cheated and receiving an inequitable share of higher prices were 
registered against the state. The government dismissed the complaint arguing that 
stabilization was necessary to form reserves to guarantee producers stable prices, to 
lend money for development purpose and to mitigate the severity of inflationary 
pressures (Falola, 1996, 153). 
 The regional governments thus took on the role of caretaker for the development 
of their regions. At first, all major investments were left to foreign firms but these 
regions soon increasingly involved themselves in large scale productive and 
commercial operations through the inauguration of regional Development Boards. 
While the economic contributions of such enterprises were frequently dissipated 
through corruption and misappropriation, they were significant in providing a source 
for primitive accumulation by an incipient capital class in society at large (Beckam, 
2004). The regional Development Boards were followed by the regional Development 
Corporations which extended their activities from agriculture to manufacturing, 
banking, insurance, finance, property and hotels (Forrest, 1994, 26). 
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3. The Role of Licensed Buying Agents  
  
One of the major responsibilities of the Marketing Boards was to license buyers for the 
procurement of export crops. The Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board’s first report 
defended the system of appointing Licensed Buying Agents (LBAs) on the grounds that 
it was essential to ensure the continuance of orderly marketing introduced under war-
time control scheme (Baldwin, 1954, 19).  
 The Boards issued licenses to private firms, empowering them to purchase the 
needed export crops in the rural areas for resale to the board at a fixed commission. 
Although the Marketing Boards were the sole buyers of these crops, the LBAs were 
essentially needed for the bulking and transportation of these crops to the various 
established depots for onward transportation abroad. The Boards did not collect the 
crops directly from the producers. In some instances, the LBAs bought from the ‘scalers’ 
i.e. the unlicensed private traders who in turn purchased from ‘pan’ buyers i.e. small-
scale rural traders who bought  and resold to the LBAs, who often provided transport 
from rural bulking points to a major town. Officially, farmers were supposed to receive 
the posted Marketing Board price for their produce from either an LBA but in practice, 
both LBAs and their agents paid less. They managed to do so chiefly by giving farmers 
advances for their crops. In exchange for a cash loan or an advance of pesticides and 
fertilizer, a farmer agreed to deliver his crop to the buyer-creditor who could then pay 
what he liked for the produce committed to him, in advance (Berry, 1985, 90-91). The 
LBAs served as middlemen between the Marketing Boards and producers of primary 
products. Although most of these LBAs were non-Nigerians, a handful of indigenous 
LBAs and middlemen participated in the Marketing Board system. Prior to  the 
introduction of the LBA system, Nigerian middlemen, traders and firms engaged in 
trading activities in spite of the unfavourable conditions occasioned by the European 
traders and firms. These were unable to compete favourably with the European traders 
and firms. To register their dissatisfaction against these European firms, the African 
traders often engaged the foreign firms in series of commercial conflicts. One of such 
was the cocoa pool incident. The cocoa pool incident of 1938 resulted as a result of a 
collusion in which the ten European firms responsible for roughly 90 percent of cocoa 
exports signed a buying agreement designed to reduce the prices they paid for Nigerian 
cocoa. When cocoa producers caught a whiff of this agreement, they quickly organized 
to boycott the firms in question. This incident demonstrated to Nigerians the extent to 
which the colonial system deliberately sought to exploit them (Falola and Heaton, 2008, 
142). Indeed, some indigenous African firms and cocoa traders who had sufficient 
capital at their disposal used the opportunity created by the cocoa pool to their own 
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advantage, even though it had caused a comprehensive havoc to the generality of the 
indigenous traders and middlemen. From late 1937, these companies prepared to export 
cocoa directly to Europe. These firms were the Ibadan-based ‚United Development 
Trading Company‛ owned by R.O Makanjuola, A. Giwa and others, ‚Odutola Bros‛ 
from Ijebu-Ode (Harniet, 1996, 34). 
  An estimated number of Nigerian middlemen engaged in marketing of major 
Nigerian primary products such as cocoa and palm produce even after the Second 
World War. The estimate was about 100,000. The middlemen became a crucial part of 
the marketing machinery. With advances of cash from the firms, they purchased 
produce from the farmers and in turn were credited by the firms. Their excess profits, 
which were large, depended upon their skill in taking advantage of price changes as 
well as upon the illiteracy of the primary producer. However, statutory marketing 
arrangements, which became the order of the day during and after the war tended to 
adversely affect the business of the middlemen. This owed largely to the fact that under 
the arrangements, the firms became Licensed Buying Agents and the middlemen 
became accredited to the firms, and prices and profits for both groups were largely 
determined by the Marketing Boards. Consequently, the system, which had been 
operational since 1939 drastically, limited the opportunities once possessed by the 
middlemen, to amass capital. Although the middlemen were often exploitative in their 
activities, the capital amassed was used to carry out other entrepreneurial activities. 
However, during the post war period, Nigerian leaders were able to acquire control 
over the boards and Nigerian LBAs and exporters were given support and 
encouragement (Coleman, 1960, 83-84). The buying agents used middlemen who went 
from one village to the next to buy the products. The middlemen usually did not pay 
the prices set by Marketing Boards, as they too had to make profits after selling to the 
big buying agents. The competition among the middlemen was fierce, and each 
resorted to various ways to undermine the others. The most common method was to 
advance credit to the famer and to obtain their products much later, thereby buying far 
below the market rate (Falola, 2004, 99). 
 The marketing arrangements after the war were not different from what was 
obtained during the war years. The Boards also appointed and determined the number 
of buying agents, as well as the profits they were able to make. The Boards determined 
the remuneration to the buying agents, which covered the costs of buying the crops, the 
marketing and management costs as well as the profit. Under the arrangements, an 
agent was required to obtain a license to operate, thus giving the Boards the right to 
control whoever had a license. Another area of convergence between the war years and 
the post war years’ arrangements was that the European firms were the most favoured. 
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 For example, a buying agent was allowed to buy a minimum of 250 tons, initially 
with its own money, which was as high as £5,000 in a buying season. To receive a 
license, a firm must provide evidence that it had at least over £5,000 storage facilities, 
labour and adequate resources to transport the products to the port cities. This 
condition made it difficult for Nigerians to participate as agents (Falola, 2004).  
 Until the regionalization of Marketing Boards, the discriminating system of LBAs 
aimed at preventing the rise of an indigenous trading aristocracy. The high barrier of 
entry towards acquisition of the license among indigenous traders resulted in a few 
class of merchant elite with trade dominated by Europeans and Lebanese businessmen. 
In the Northern Region, LBAs had the task of buying agricultural produce like 
groundnut and cotton from the local farmers and to transport the goods to the regional 
market centres where they were bought up for onward shipment to Europe. For this 
reason, many LBAs established transport companies of their own which later became 
the starting point for their further commercial activities (Loimeier, 1997, 88). Indeed, an 
important factor for the effective purchasing and acquisition of Nigerian agricultural 
produce was the establishment and development of the transport sector. The history of 
the establishment of modern transportation dates back to the early 1900s when 
motorable roads and railways were built and linked together for effective 
transportation of Nigerian agricultural produce and raw materials to Britain. This effort 
became intensified after the Second World War (WWII) with the use of road and rail 
transportation as a means of pursuing colonial economic interests in Nigeria. Effective 
transportation was needed for the movement of goods from the hinterland to the coast. 
The routes of roads and railways strategically established directed goods in directions 
that served British colonial economic interests. Hence colonial transportation network 
ran from north to south, linking the interior centres with the coastal ports. A number of 
feeder roads constructed aided transportation of needed agricultural commodities to 
their various depots by the LBAs. In the regions, transportation eased the movement of 
primary products to the port. For example in the Northern Region people began to 
produce groundnuts for export when the railway was extended to Funtua and to Kaura 
Namoda (Watts, 1987, 179). However, the LBA system dictated that only those traders 
who commanded a sufficient knowledge of the English language as well as the art of 
bookkeeping had the opportunity to trade in cotton and groundnut, the most profitable 
goods. Further qualifying conditions were the ability to make an annual minimum 
purchase of five hundred tons of groundnuts and command over a capital basis of 
£10,000. These stringent measures meant that out of a total of 22 LBAs for groundnut 
marketing in the early 1950s, only 2 indigenous traders qualified, while in the cotton 
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trade no indigenous trader was represented at all among the 13 official LBAs (Loimeier, 
1997, 89).  
 The situation began to change after 1954 as more Nigerians were able to 
participate as agents. With Nigerians in control of regional government, pioneer 
politicians found ways to channel capital to local entrepreneurs, including offering 
Nigerian entrepreneurs advanced payments for goods and even contracts. The new 
Nigerian banks awarded credit to businessmen and the emerging cooperative banks 
also trusted them with credit. Only when this system was modified after regionalisation 
and the conditions for obtaining licenses relaxed by reducing the original capital 
required that indigenous buying agents gained currency by the Boards. In Northern 
Nigeria for example, the original capital required for buying was reduced to £1,000 and 
the buying capacity to 300 tons of groundnuts annually and thus, two indigenous 
traders al-Hassan Dantata and Ibrahim Musa Gashash emerged to cash in on this 
opportunity to become licensed buyers (Loimeier, 1997). Thus in the late 1950s Nigerian 
traders replaced the foreign firms as LBAs for the Boards (Watts, 1987, 179). Examples 
included Chief D.O. Sanyaolu Olude’ Stores which became one of the Licensed Buying 
Agents for the Nigerian Groundnut Marketing Board, and A.O Alakija and Peter Eket 
Inyang Udoh (Prince Eket), who became one of the first African Licensed Buying 
Agents for the Palm Produce Marketing Board (Olaniyi, 2013, 133). By 1960, there was a 
rise in the number of African LBAs in their share of crops purchased after independence 
in 1960 when UAC and other European firms began to withdraw from buying cocoa. 
Ultimately, the LBA system generated a growing cadre of Nigerian administrators and 
managers engaged in state capitalist enterprises (Beckam, 2004).  
 These publicly sanctioned monopolies used for the purchase and export of 
agricultural produce were generally exploitative in nature. While the indigenous LBAs 
received their share of discrimination, exploitation of farmers came from both the by the 
middlemen and the European buyers. Since a monopsony is a single buyer; and where 
there are many sellers but only one buyer, the buyer can strongly influence the price 
only to his own advantage. This was exactly the case with the Marketing Boards even 
after the 1954 regionalisation and reorganisation.  
 
4. Western Region Marketing Board 
 
The Western Region Marketing Board (WRMB) was a statutory corporation established 
in 1954 as part of a political restructuring that expanded the administrative capacities of 
the Nigerian Regions. The Regional Boards replaced the Nigerian Commodity Boards 
established between 1947 and 1949 with new regionally focused Boards. Nigeria then 
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had four commodities and Marketing Boards- one each for cocoa, oil palm produce, 
groundnut and cotton. The 1954 Boards created after the 1954 Constitutional 
Conference were charged with the buying and distribution of export produce from their 
respective Regions, to transport it to the ports for sale and also to develop the cash crop 
industry in their regions (Tamuno, 2006). The 1954 regionalisation of the Commodity 
Marketing Boards was a consequence of the introduction of a new colonial constitution, 
which not only solidified the division of Nigeria into three regions, but also created 
federal structures, which ceded considerable autonomy to the three regions of Nigeria. 
In the aftermath of the implementation of the constitution, the accumulated reserves of 
the defunct commodity marketing boards were shared among the newly created 
regional marketing boards. The Western Region Marketing Board received £42.9 million 
(Walker, 2003, 363). 
 Prior to regionalization, the accumulation of large reserves was primarily 
fortuitous and unpremeditated. It was at that time as intended by the governmental 
authorities that they should be used for stabilizing purposes. From 1954 onwards the 
earning of trading surpluses were now used for the intensified development efforts 
(Walker, 2003, 589). Having seen the enormous potential for the raising of revenues 
which the price-fixing function of the Marketing Board offered, the Western Region 
began consciously to take advantage of it for development purposes. The Region 
continued to earn trading surpluses after 1954, which cannot be reasonable regarded as 
intended for stabilization. The 1960-65 Western Region Development Plan called for a 
further contribution of £21 million from the Western Region Marketing Board over the 
course of the five year period; and with over 14.5 million already having been granted 
under the   former plan, another £10 million was called for in the 1962-68 Development 
Plan. Thus, in the public sector, the Marketing Board was the main source of savings for 
the improvement of agriculture and allied industries and the pro vision of social 
services. The Marketing Board’s contribution was, in fact 40 percent of the total 
available domestic finance for the capital programme. By this time, the savings could no 
longer refer merely to the running down of previously acquired assets. It was now 
obviously intended to run trading surpluses to finance the regional government’s 
programme.   
 These Boards became a dominant economic system in the Nigerian economy 
controlling 63% of the foreign exchange earned by the country in 1961. The regional 
marketing system created monopolies as they were the only authorized commodity 
buyers of Cocoa, Groundnut, Palm and Cotton in the 1950s and 1960s. In Southern 
Nigerian, the Boards expanded their stabilisation role of acting as trustees for the 
farmers to taxing the producers’ income to fund government programmes (Ekundare, 
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1973). The main thrust of the Regional Marketing Boards was to use revenue 
accumulated by the board to finance various development programmes in the regions. 
Price stabilization which had been a major component of the operations of the defunct 
Commodity Marketing Board was relegated to the background. There were certain 
aspects of the former structure that the new regional Boards retained. For example, the 
development Boards of the old system that was responsible for research and 
development of improved varieties of the agricultural exports were incorporated into 
the new structure and now called Development Corporations. 
  WRMB took over the reins of the Nigeria Cocoa Marketing Board created in 1947 
and became the single seller of Cocoa from Nigeria. The Board was also involved in 
selling Palm Kernels and in funding agricultural research and development and 
extension services. The Board's initial major role was to act as a stabilizing force in the 
Cocoa industry, this role was a relic of the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board but the 
Marketing Board evolved later to become a major source of government saving used for 
the financing of government sponsored projects, to purchase equity and offer loans to 
private companies, the latter situation later generated some controversy and allegations 
of corruption in the 1960s in respect to some investments in the National Investment 
Property Company and a few others. 
 Much of the stabilization role was performed by buying cocoa and palm kernels 
from producers at a fixed price usually below market price and selling it in the 
international market. The surplus was saved as a reserve to supplement future shortfall 
in producer incomes as a result of declining prices. However, prior to the formation of 
the regional Marketing Board, the Cocoa prices in the international market was 
undergoing a bullish phase leading to allegations of a cartel against the British and 
stability was ensured by a fixed rate in an upward market price trend. From the mid 
1950s to the early 1960s, cocoa prices fell and this stability system became less rigid and 
prone to price fluctuations in a downward price trend. The deleterious pricing strategy 
adopted by the Western Nigerian Marketing Board led to a very significant diminishing 
rate of production response.  
 Be that as it may, the Western Region Marketing Board’s price fixing generated 
surplus which was later used to finance some of the investments of the Western Region 
Finance Corporation, Western Nigeria Development Corporation and agricultural 
development. The Board also earned income from investments in securities. Between 
1955 and 1960 the Western Region planned a capital disbursement of £20 million taken 
from the Board to finance developmental purposes and another £21 million was 
planned between 1960 and 1965. The regional marketing boards became the primary 
financiers of the regional governments which in turn gave loans to and bought shares in 
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private companies. The regional governments also gave loans to development 
corporations. Since the development corporations were statutory bodies that were 
independent of the legislature, the political leaders in the regions were concerned with 
not only in terms of the revenue was  allocated to them but also how the money was 
spent. However, the Regional Marketing Boards were mired in financial irregularities, 
as substantial investments were made in companies that were intended to advance 
political interests (Walker, 2003).  
  Revenue from the sale of cocoa alone accounted for about seventy-five percent of 
the capital accumulated by the Marketing Board from sale of all cash crops. Palm 
produce, rubber, cotton, and fresh fruits also contributed to the revenue of the 
Marketing Board. The Board invested over £ 3 million in the National Bank of Nigeria 
and as soon as the Regional government embarked upon its Development Plan of 1955-
1960, the WRMB was instructed to £6 million available for development schemes 
covering water supply, education and health services, in the region Ekundare, 1973, 83).  
According to the annual reports of Nigerian marketing Boards, the greatest trading 
surpluses over the 1954-1961 period were earned by the WRMB, which was already the 
wealthiest at the outset of the period. Over £14.3 million were withheld from Western 
Region producers, £9.7 million of which came from palm kernel producer. The 
remaining £4.6 million came from palm kernel producers, who contributed in the East 
and West together over £10.7 million to total marketing board reserves. The western 
Region Marketing Boards’ wealth also produced net income to another £5.3 million, 
mainly from interest on the securities held in its investment portfolios (Walker, 2003).        
 Thus, it was evident that the creation of these Boards under the regional 
governments created an opportunity to convert the Boards from price and income 
stabilization instrument to major fiscal instruments for generating huge revenues for 
regional governments through taxes on farmers (F.A.O, 1989, 87-96). The Western 
Region Marketing Board had by now apart from its other responsibilities, a fiscal arm of 
the Western Nigerian government (Helleiner, 1977, 11). Between1954 and 1962, the 
Marketing Board realized the sum of £54 million as surplus of revenue over 
expenditure. £31 million of this was granted to various ministries, £14 million was lent 
to the government and various corporations such as housing, development and finance 
corporations owned by the government. £10 million was invested in various Nigerian 
companies, another £10 million was divided between Agbon Magbe Bank, the 
Merchants’ Bank, the Association of Nigerian Cooperative Exporters , the Cooperative 
Bank of Western Nigeria, the Nigerian Produce Marketing Company, the National 
Bank, and the National Investments and Properties Company (Osuntokun, 1984, 82-83).  
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On social programmess, one of the laudable projects of the WRMB was the provision of 
£5 million grant for the take-off of the University of Ife. It also provided funds for the 
endowment of scholarships and research on agriculture at the university college, 
Ibadan (Ugbogu, 2012, 88). The Western region established the Western Region 
Development Production Board in 1950, which was funded by the WRMB to facilitate 
development within the region. The Board was established in 1950, reconstituted in 
1951, and continued to exist until the end of June 1955, when it was replaced by another 
Board with a similar name. Between 1950 and 55, funds were made available to the 
Development Board from the surpluses of  WRMB In the western region, from 1956 
onward, the funds of the WRMB accrued to the regional government which in turn 
allocated money to the Marketing Board. A sum of £45 million was allocated by the 
regional government to the board in 1956. The Development Board also transferred its 
responsibilities on roads and scholarships to other government agencies in order to 
focus more on agriculture and industries (Falola, 2004, 111). Consequent upon 
regionalization Nigeria’s Commodity Marketing Boards were reorganized as Regional 
Marketing Boards providing a fiscal base for the politicians to whom control of the new 
regional governments was now devolved. Reserves from WRMB were now used to 
fund several developmental projects, leading to industrialization as well as their private 
business activities and to pay for their party political campaigns. Ultimately, Western 
Nigeria Regional government embarked on using agricultural exports to amass 
sufficient capital for development projects. To this end, the government of Western 
Region established a number of Boards and Corporations aimed at developing the 
region. It has to be noted that larger percentage of capital used by these establishments 
were diverted from the Western Nigeria Marketing Board.   
 One of the best illustrations of the diversion of capital from agriculture to 
industry is provided by the actions of Western Regional government. The government 
directly invested in promising projects and also provided capital for investments by 
private individuals. The instruments for these activities were two statutory 
corporations, Western Nigeria Development Corporation (WNDC) and Western Region 
Finance Corporation (WRFC). The government provided the capital for both agencies. 
What is significant is the source of this capital and the terms on which it was made 
available. The source was agriculture, and the terms were concessionary. 
 During the period in which these Corporations functioned, they received bulk of 
their finances from the WRMB. Between 1949 and 1958, the Development Corporations 
received £11 million from the MB and that over 70% of its funds came from the 
Marketing Board. The Board itself was easily influenced because it was under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry diverted resources 
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from the Board ostensibly into the promotion of industrial and developmental projects. 
Often time, the ministry issued directives to the Board instructing it to loan requisite 
funds to the government corporation requesting it. However, these loans were never 
returned by these Corporations (Bates, 1981, 19).  
 
5. Western Nigeria Development Corporation (WNDC) 
 
WNDC was the successor of the original Western Regional Production Development 
Board, which was established in 1951, and the Western Regional Production and 
Development Board of 1955. The Board was responsible for undertaking projects for the 
development of agriculture and industry in Western Nigeria. The Board’s funds 
consisted initially of grants made to it by the former cocoa and oil palm products 
Marketing Board. Sponsorship of the Corporation was continued by WRMB, the fiscal 
arm of the Western Region government. The Board assumed a new name, Western 
Nigeria Development Corporation in 1959.Thus from 1955; the Corporation was 
financed by the Western Nigerian government under its Development Programme of 
1955-60. It would be recalled that in 1955, the government under Obafemi Awolowo 
launched its 1955-1960 development Plan with the raison d’être of undertaking projects 
which individual initiatives and private capital were inadequate to execute. Under this 
Plan, the government’s efforts were to complement the private sector economy and not 
to be in competition with it (Ugbogu, 2012, 33). The Western Nigerian government set 
aside a capital provision of £4.5 million for the Corporation. The main emphasis of the 
original Board was on agricultural development, but the activities of the new 
Corporation were much wider in scope.  
  WNDC was the chief agency of government for the undertaking of agricultural 
and industrial enterprises. The Corporation was empowered to embark on industrial 
project for which capital was not forthcoming; to launch large scale enterprises 
involving large capital resources and to attract outside capital to these projects. The 
Corporation derives its powers from Western Nigeria law of 1957 which transferred to 
it the property, rights and obligations of the former Western Region Production 
Development Board, which was established in 1955 and saddled with the responsibility 
of facilitating the creation of new industries and expansion of old ones and to utilize 
indigenous agricultural raw materials for production. The newly created WNDC was, 
however wider in scope than its predecessor.   
  Efforts were made to develop partnership schemes on agricultural products with 
cooperative societies and local government authorities. Besides the agricultural 
activities- which included plantations for rubber, oil palm, cocoa, citrus and pineapples 
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– the Corporation established canning and rubber processing  factories in Ibadan and 
Ikpoba respectively. The Corporation’s non-agricultural activities included a first class 
catering rest house in Ibadan. It also participated both financially and administratively 
in the direction of a variety of industries, including the manufacture of cement, plastic, 
metal window frames, asbestos, cement products, aluminum products, pre-stressed 
concrete, textiles and beddings. The establishment of the WNDC greatly stimulated 
industrial development in Nigeria between 1954 and 1960. Indeed, it can be said that 
the little autonomy which was provided by the 1954 Constitution was exploited by 
Nigerian leaders to give a leap to the country’s industrial development (Onyemelukwe, 
1984, 17). 
 During the plan period 1955-1960, the Corporation’s performance was successful. 
For instance, it operated the Ikpoba rubber processing factory the Lafia Canning factory 
and the Lafia Hotel. In addition, overseas capital was in many cases attracted to the 
region. In association with the overseas capital, the Corporation launched about a 
dozen large scale industrial ventures including the Nigerian Plastic Company Limited, 
Ibadan, the Nigerian Domestic Industrial Gas Supply Company Limited, the Nigerian 
Pre-stressed Concrete Company Limited at Abeokuta, and the Tower Aluminum (Nig.) 
Ltd at Ikeja. Apart from the Corporation’s other projects whose value was nearly £12 
million, its investments in industrial ventures during the Plan period amounted to 
£999,000. 
 The Corporation’s plantations covered some 35,000 acres of which 23,000 was 
planted with oil palms, rubber, cocoa, citrus fruits cashew nuts coffee and pineapples. It 
also established plantations in association with the local government bodies and 
cooperative societies, with total acreages 5,002 and 4,092 respectively under the 
Development Plan for 1962-68. £3 million pounds was also allocated for the plantations 
and £10 million pounds for large scale industries. (Anon, 1962, 60-61) The Nkalagu 
Cement factory of 1954 was soon followed by another factory in Western Nigeria. 
Investigations in 1955 and 56 sponsored by the Associated Portland Cement 
Manufacturers Ltd., with the agreement with WNDC revealed that there were 
limestone deposits in the area from Ilaro to the border of Dahomey and consequently, 
cement factory was established in 1957. In February 1959, the West African Portland 
Cement was established in Nigeria as a public company to own and operate the cement 
works. The equity capital of the company was subscribed by the Associated Portland 
Cement Manufacturers Ltd,(51%), the Western Nigerian Development Corporation 
(39%) and the UAC Ltd. (10%). The rated output was 200,000 tons per annum which 
was double the output at Nlakagu. The factory conveniently sited at Ewekoro at a point 
where the main trunk road and the railway converge to within 300 yards of each other. 
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Construction started in the mid-1958 and production began towards the latter part of 
1960. At that time, it was the largest single undertaking to have been established in 
Nigeria (Ekundare, 1973, 305-6). By 1962, the Corporation had acquired a financial 
interest  in fifteen companies and  held over fifty percent of the shares in the following 
companies: Nigerian Plastics Company Ltd, Nidoglas Ltd, the Nigerian Plastics 
Company(sales) Ltd, Nigersol Construction Company Ltd, and the Nigerian Water 
Resources Development Company Ltd. The Development Corporation also undertook 
agricultural projects worth millions. It owned the Araromi Rubber Estate in Ikene, 
Awolowo’s village, which cost the Corporation one and a half million pounds to 
develop. The Corporation also acquired palm oil plantations at Apoje at a cost of 
£569,000 and at Irele, Ewohimi and Igwuben more plantations were set up at a cost of 
£630,000. Cocoa projects at Odo and Ibokun cost £546,000. Cashew plantations at Eruwa 
and Iwo cost the Corporation £170,000. A coffee plantation was also established at Owo 
at the cost £170,000. The Corporaltion between 1954 and 1962 also invested one and a 
half million pounds in industries and hotel businesses (Falola, 2004, 115). 
 In 1951, a food canning plant was established in Ibadan by the Department of 
Commerce and Industry (Federal) but was subsequently taken over by the WNDC. The 
experiment proved that local pineapple and citrus crops could be successfully canned. 
In 1952, output at the Ibadan factory included 392,000cans of grape fruit segments, 58 
thousand cans of grape fruit juice, 5,00 cans of pineapple crush and slices, and 2,000 
cans of Nigerian food stuff (Ekundare, 1973, 300).   
  WNDC embraced manufacturing, banking, insurance, hotels and catering, 
agriculture and real estate. The Western Region Housing Corporation built the 350-acre 
Bodija Housing Estate with 173 houses under construction in 1959, and 750-acre Ikeja 
Housing Industrial Estate, out of which housing got 550 acres. Two hundred acres went 
to the building of an industrial estate. Several trading companies were also established. 
Prominent were National Bank of Nigeria, Nigeria General Insurance Corporation Ltd, 
Granvil Enthoven and Co. and the Cooperative Bank (Adedara, 2012, 30).  
 
6. Western Region Finance Corporation 
 
The Western Region Finance Corporation (WRFC) was a credit and investment firm 
owned by the Western Nigeria regional government. It was established in 1955 and was 
placed as an investment firm under the region's Ministry of Trade and Industry. The 
Corporation's major responsibility was to grant loans to small agricultural and 
industrial firms and to invest in or acquire established foreign companies operating in 
the country. The Corporation acquired, Arab Brothers for £ 1.1 million and also 
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acquired 45.5 % shareholding in G.L. Gaiser for £250, 000 and a share worth £ 120, 000 
of Ikeja Arms Hotel. From 1955-1962, it made a total investment and credit grant of 5 
million pounds. However, by 1964, it suspended operations in investment and credit 
allocation as a result of operational inefficiencies rising partly due increasing loan 
defaults (Anon, 1962, 90-91).  
 WRFC was established by Western Regional Law no 9 of 1955 to take over the 
interests and functions of the Western Region Development (Loans) Board with effect 
from April, 1955. These functions include the financing of projects capable of furthering 
the development of agriculture industry and commerce throughout the region. As an 
economic arm of the regional government, the finance corporation provides only such 
credits as cannot be readily obtained from banks, commercial houses or other credit 
organizations. Loans were strictly granted for economically productive ventures as 
distinct from social or amenity ventures (Anon, 1962). 
  WRFC was chartered to give advances and loans to financial institutions like 
banks and insurance companies. It could finance motor transportation businesses, 
erection of buildings, own and collect rents from them. Such enterprises must be located 
in the Western Region of Nigeria. It empowered to take over an existing company, no 
matter its size and equity, but subject to approval of the governor-in- council (Ugbogu, 
2012, 102). The bulk of the finances used by the WRFC were derived from the WNDC.  
 In addition to giving loans to enterprises, WRFC acquired already existing 
companies whose owners advertised for sale. In most cases, it had to enter into 
agreement with the original owners to provide skilled and technical services since the 
Finance Corporation could not provide adequate skilled and technical human resources 
to take over the managerial positions of those acquired companies (Ugbogu, 2012, 110).   
  When WRFC was established in 1955, it was empowered to grant loans for 
industrial as well as agricultural and commercial projects. It was also empowered to 
grant loans to non-Nigerians who were in partnership with Western region enterprises. 
The Corporation intensified its loan activities to farmers as it was realized that short 
term agricultural loans were becoming popular, and established 209 local Loans Boards. 
These were corporate entities administering agricultural and fishing loans under the 
guidance of the corporation. Corn mills loans were granted to quite a number of people 
as this was purely a small-scale industry usually located near market places where the 
demand for processed grains was likely to justify the establishment of a mill. Loans 
were also granted for projects including rubber plantations, poultry farming, textile 
factories, saw mills, sea fishing including transport and some local authorities even 
borrowed from the corporation to finance road tarring, market development and 
improvements to motor parks. By 1960, it had granted loans totaling 1.4 million pounds 
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for industrial purposes. In suitable case, it made direct equity investments for 
businesses for which indigenous capital were not readily available and by 1960, it had 
invested a total of 1.5 million pounds in this way (Ekundare 1973, 246-247). Since 
agriculture was the mainstay of the region’s economy, the corporation is determined to 
ensure that agricultural loans go to as many deserving farmers as possible. For this 
purpose, it established 209 local loans boards. They are corporate entities administering 
agriculture and fishing loans under the guidance of the corporation in cooperation with 
experts in the ministry of agriculture and natural resource. Agric loans were intended 
for the production of cocoa, seasonal food crops and inland water fisheries. Loans for 
rubber cultivation are expected to be added to this list. 
 During the 1955-1960 Development Plan which also marked the first five years of 
its existence, the Western Region Financial Corporation granted agricultural loans 
totaling 1,344.435 pounds. These were issued for seasonal food crops, inland water 
fishing and stimulation of cocoa production. During the same period, industrial loans 
amounted to 485,325 pounds were issued for assorted projects such as rubber factories, 
joinery and woodwork, motor vehicle repairs and tyre retreading factories. Direct 
equity investments were also made in a number of commercial and industrial 
enterprises such as the Epe Boat yard, G.L. Gaiser, Airport Hotel, Arab Brothers Ltd 
and the great Nigeria industrial company. During the development plan period, 1962-
1968, the government of Western Nigeria embarked a sum of 6.8 million pounds from 
industrial and agricultural credits, which was administered by the Finance Corporation 
(Ekundare 1973, 59-60).  
 WRMB soon became insolvent due to excesses from the leadership. Most of the 
funds were diverted to finance the regional party, Action Group and personal use. In 
1954, the Western Region Marketing Board could boast of £6.2 million. However, by 
May 1962, the Development Corporation had to exist on overdrafts amounting to over 
£2.5 million. A loan of £6.7 million was made to the Western Region government-
owned National Investment and Properties Co., Ltd. for building projects out of which 
only £500,000 was repaid. The Western Region Finance Corporation and the Western 
Nigeria Development Corporation also received loans of millions of pounds. None of 
these loans were ever repaid. The Western Nigeria Development Corporation was too 
weakened financially to repay the millions it owed the Board. The Coker Commission 
of Inquiry found Chief Awolowo, the regional and party leader culpable for the ills of 
the Western Region Marketing Board, due to his failure to adhere to the standards of 
conduct, which were required of persons holding public office. (Ogbeidi, 2012) 
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7. Conclusion 
 
Produce buying in Nigeria during the period under study although conditioned by the 
market forces of demand and supply, cannot be said to be favourable to the producers 
of these commodities, namely the farmers who were at the receiving end of the joint 
exploitative activities of both the state and middle men. Conversely, the Marketing 
Board system adopted as part of colonial economic strategy for the effective 
procurement and acquisition of Nigerian primary products was a blessing in disguise in 
spite of its unfair treatment. This is because Regional Marketing Boards became the 
fiscal arm of the regional governments and more so, the funds generated were diverted 
to development project. The Western Region government took advantage of this to 
embark on state led development and industrialization through the establishment of 
development corporations being funded through its Marketing Board. With the 
activities of these corporations, the Region moved from the slide show to the centre 
stage of becoming the pioneer of Nigeria’s industrialization. This process was, however, 
circumscribed due to misappropriation and diversion of funds derived from the 
Western Region Marketing Board.  
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